Abstract Robustness in response to unexpected events is always desirable for real-world networks. To improve the robustness of any networked system, it is important to analyze vulnerability to external perturbation such as random failures or adversarial attacks occurring to elements of the network. In this paper, we study an emerging problem in assessing the robustness of complex networks: the vulnerability of the clustering of the network to the failure of network elements. Specifically, we identify vertices whose failures will critically damage the network by degrading its clustering, evaluated through the average clustering coefficient. This problem is important because any significant change made to the clustering, resulting from element-wise failures, could degrade network performance such as the ability for information to propagate in a social network. We formulate this vulnerability analysis as an optimization problem, prove its NP-completeness and non-monotonicity, and offer two algorithms to identify the vertices most important to clustering. Finally, we conduct comprehensive experiments in synthesized social networks generated by various well-known models as well as traces of real social networks. The empirical results over other competitive strategies show the efficacy of our proposed algorithms.
Introduction
Network resilience to attacks and failures has been a growing concern in recent times. Robustness is perhaps one of the most desirable properties for corporeal complex networks, such as the World Wide Web, transportation networks, communication networks, biological networks, tw and social information networks. Roughly speaking, robustness of a network evaluates how much the normal functionality of the network is affected in case of external perturbation; i.e., it measures the resilience of the network in response to unexpected events such as adversarial attacks and random failures (Holme et al. 2002) . Complex systems that can sustain their organizational structure, functionality, and responsiveness under such unexpected perturbation are considered more robust than those that fail to do so. The concept of vulnerability has generally been used to realize and characterize the lack of robustness and resilience of complex systems (Criado and Romance 2012) . In order to improve the robustness of real-world systems, it is therefore important to obtain key insights into the structural vulnerabilities of the networks representing them. A major aspect of this is to analyze and understand the effect of failure (either intentionally or at random) of individual components on the degree of clustering in the network.
Clustering is a fundamental network property that has been shown to be relevant to a variety of topics. For example, consider the propagation of information through a social network, such as the spread of a rumor. A growing body of work has identified the importance of clustering to such propagation; the more clustered a network is, the easier it is for information to propagate (Centola 2010; Barclay et al. 2013; Lü et al. 2011; Malik and Mucha 2013; Centola 2011 ). In addition, in Fig. 1 , we show experimentally a strong relationship between the final spread of information and the level of clustering in the network, with higher clustering corresponding to higher levels of expected spread. The importance of clustering is not limited to social networks; in the context of air transportation networks, Ponton et al. (2013) argued that higher clustering of such a network is beneficial, as passengers for a canceled flight can be rerouted more easily. In this work, we use average local clustering coefficient (ALCC) as our definition and measure of clustering in a network. ALCC was proposed for this purpose by Watts and Strogatz (1998) .
The identification of elements that crucially affect the clustering of the network, as a result, is of great impact. For example, as a matter of homeland security, the critical elements for clustering in homeland communication networks should receive greater resources for protection; in complement, the identification of critical elements in a social network of adversaries could potentially limit the spread of information in such a network. However, most studies of network vulnerability in the literature focus on how the network behaves when its elements (nodes and edges) are removed based on the pair-wise connectivity (Shen et al. 2013; Dinh and Thai 2015b) , natural connectivity (Hau et al. 2014) , or using centrality measures, such as degrees, betweenness (Albert et al. 2000) , the geodesic length (Holme et al. 2002) , eigenvector (Allesina and Pascual 2009) , etc. To our knowledge, none of the existing work has examined the average local clustering coefficient from the perspective of vulnerability-as evidenced by the examples above, the damage made to the average clustering, resulted from element-wise failures, can potentially have severe effects on the functionality of the network. This drives the need for an analysis of clustering vulnerabilities in complex networks.
Finding a solution for this emerging problem, nevertheless, is fundamentally yet technically challenging because (1) the behavior of ALCC is not monotonic with respect to node removal and thus can be unpredictable even in response to minor changes, and (2) given large sizes of real networks, the NP-completeness of the problem prohibits the tractable computation of an exact solution. In this paper, we tackle the problem and analyze the vulnerabilities of the network clustering. Particularly, we ask the question:
Given a complex network, the failure of which set of vertices maximally degrades the network clustering as measured by ALCC?
There are many advantages of ALCC over other structural measures (Watts and Strogatz 1998): (1) it is one of the most popular metrics for evaluating network clusteringthe higher the ALCC of a network the better clustering it exhibits, (2) it implies multiple network modular properties such as small-world scale-free phenomena, small diameter and modular structure (or community structure), and (3) it is meaningful on both connected and disconnected as well as dense and sparse graphs: sparse networks are expected to have small clustering coefficient, whereas extant complex networks are found to have high clustering coefficients.
Our contributions in this paper are:
• We define the Clustering Vulnerability Assessment (CVA) on complex networks, which formulates the problem to degrade ALCC of a network. We show CVA is NPcomplete, and we provide rigorous proofs and vulnerability analysis for random failures and targeted attacks. To our knowledge, this is the first time the problem and the analysis are studied specifically for ALCC.
• Given the intractability of the problem, we provide two efficient algorithms which scale to large networks to identify the worst-case scenarios of adversarial attacks.
• We conduct comprehensive experiments in both synthesized networks (generated by various well-known models) and real networks. The empirical results over Fig. 1 Relationship between the value of ALCC and the expected number of activations under the LT and IC models, normalized by initial value. For more details and discussion of p, see Sect. 7 other methods show the efficacy and scalability of our proposed algorithms.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews studies that are related to our work. Section 3 describes the notations, measure functions, and the problem definition. Section 4 shows the proof of NP-completeness implying the intractability of the problem. Sections 5 and 6 present our analysis of clustering behaviors on random failures and targeted attacks, respectively. In Sect. 7, we provide further evidence for a correlation between the extent of influence propagation and ALCC. In Sect. 8, we report empirical results of our approaches in comparison with other strategies. Finally, Sect. 9 concludes the paper.
Related work
Vulnerability assessment has attracted a large amount of attention from the network science community. Work in the literature can be divided into two categories: measuring the robustness and manipulating the robustness of a network. In measuring the robustness, different measures and metrics have been proposed such as the graph connectivity (Dinh and Thai 2015b) , the diameter, relative size of largest components, and average size of the isolated cluster (Albert et al. 2000) . Other work suggests using the minimum node/edge cut (Frank and Frisch 1970) or the second smallest nonzero eigenvalue or the Laplacian matrix (Fiedler 1973) . In terms of manipulating the robustness, different strategies have been proposed such as the removal of nodes based upon degree (Albert et al. 2000; Peixoto and Bornholdt 2012) , or by modeling node removal with graph percolation (Callaway et al. 2000) . Other studies focus on excluding nodes by centrality measures, such as betweenness and the geodesic length (Holme et al. 2002) , eigenvector (Allesina and Pascual 2009) , the shortest path between node pairs (Grubesic et al. 2008) , or the total pair-wise connectivity (Dinh and Thai 2015b) . Veremyev et al. (2015 Veremyev et al. ( , 2014 developed integer programming frameworks to determine the critical nodes that minimize a connectivity metric subject to a budgetary constraint. For more information on network vulnerability assessments, the reader is referred to the surveys Chen (2016), Gomes et al. (2016) , and references therein. The vulnerability of the average local clustering of a complex network has been a relatively unexplored area. In a related work (Nguyen et al. 2013b) , the authors introduced the community structure vulnerability to analyze how the communities are affected when top k vertices are excluded from the underlying graphs. They further provided different heuristic approaches to find out those critical components in modularity-based community structure. Alim et al. (2014b) suggested a method based on the generating edges of a community to find out the critical components. In a similar vein, Alim et al. (2014a) studied the problem of breaking all density-based communities in the network, proved its NPhardness, and suggested an approximation as well as heuristic solutions. These studies, while forming the basis of community-based vulnerability analysis, face a fundamental limitation due to the ambiguity of definitions of a community in a network. Our work overcomes this particular shortcoming as ALCC is a well-defined and commonly accepted concept for quantifying the clustering of a network. Ertem et al. (2016) studied the problem of how to detect groups of nodes in a social network with high clustering coefficient; however, their work does not consider the vulnerability of the average local clustering coefficient of a network. The diffusion of information in a social network has been studied from many perspectives, including worm containment (Nguyen et al. 2010 ), viral marketing (Kempe et al. 2003; Dinh et al. 2012 Dinh et al. , 2013 Nguyen et al. 2013a; Kuhnle et al. 2017) , and the detection of community structure (Nguyen et al. 2011; Dinh and Thai 2015a) .
3 Notations and problem definition
Notations
Let G ¼ ðV; EÞ be an undirected graph representing a complex network where V is the set of N nodes and E is the set of M edges. For a node u 2 V, denote by d u and N(u) the degree of u and the set of neighbors of u, respectively. For a subset of nodes S V, let G[S] and m S in this order denote the subgraph induced by S in G and the number of edges in this subgraph. Hereafter, the terms vertices and nodes as well as edges and links are used interchangeably. In Table 1 , we summarize the list of notations used in this work.
A graph G is triangle-free if no three vertices of G form a clique of size 3. Verifying whether a given graph G is trianglefree or not is tractable by computing the trace of A 3 where A is the adjacency matrix of G. The trace is zero if and only if the graph is triangle-free. This verification can be done in polynomial time OðN x Þ for x 2:372 with the latest matrix multiplying result (Gall 2014) . Alternatively, one can use the method of Schank and Wagner (2005) with time-complexity OðM 3=2 Þ to check whether the graph is triangle-free.
Clustering coefficients

Local clustering coefficient (LCC)
Given a node u 2 V, there are d u adjacent vertices of u in G and there are d u ðd u À 1Þ=2 possible edges among all u's neighbors. The local clustering coefficient C(u) is the probability that two random neighbors of u are connected. Equivalently, it quantifies how close the induced subgraph of neighbors is to a clique. The local clustering coefficient C(u) is defined (Watts and Strogatz 1998)
where T(u) is the number of triangles containing u. It is clear that 0 CðuÞ 1 for any u 2 V. For any node v 6 ¼ u, letC v ðuÞ denote the clustering coefficient of u in G½Vnfvg. Finally, define T(u, v) as the number of triangles containing both vertices u and v.
Average local clustering coefficient (ALCC)
In graph theory, the average local clustering coefficient (ALCC) C(G) of a graph G is a measure indicating how much vertices of G tend to cluster together (Watts and Strogatz 1998). This measure is defined as the average of LCC over all vertices in the network. C(G) is defined as:
CðuÞ: ð1Þ
Because 0 CðuÞ 1 for every node u 2 V; CðGÞ is normalized and can only take values in the range [0, 1] inclusively. For instance, CðGÞ ¼ 0 when G is a trianglefree graph and CðGÞ ¼ 1 when G is a clique or a collection of isolated cliques. The higher the clustering coefficient of G the more closely the graph locally resembles a clique or collection of isolated cliques. Also, we definẽ
Problem definition
We define the Clustering Structure Assessment problem (CSA) as follows
EÞ and a positive integer k N, find a subset S Ã V of cardinality at most k that maximizes the reduction of the clustering coefficient, i.e.,
where DCðSÞ ¼ CðGÞ À CðG½VnSÞ:
CSA problem aims to identify the most critical vertices of the network with respect to the average local clustering coefficient. The input parameter k can be interpreted as the maximum number of node failures that normal functionality of the network can withstand once adversarial attacks or random corruptions occur. Accordingly, the case jSj ¼ k identifies exactly k critical vertices and examines the worst scenarios that can happen when these vertices are compromised.
Complexity of CSA
In this section, we show the NP-completeness of CSA(G, k). This intractability indicates that an optimal solution for CSA might not be computationally feasible in practice.
Definition 2 (Decision problem-CSAðG; k; aÞ) Given a network G ¼ ðV; EÞ, a number k N, and a value 0 a 1, does there exist a set S V of size k such that DCðGÞ ! a?
Proof The proof is a modification of the well-known 3SAT to vertex cover reduction (Garey and Johnson 1990) . We show that the following subproblem of CSA(G, k, C(G)) is NP-complete; the subproblem asks for a set S V of k nodes whose removal completely degrades the clustering coefficient CðG½VnSÞ to 0, or equivalently, makes the residual graph G½VnS triangle-free (Lemma 1). To show the NP-completeness, we first show that CSA is in NP, and then prove its NP-hardness by constructing a polynomial time reduction from 3-SAT to CSA(G, k, C(G)). Given a set S V of k nodes, one can verify whether G½VnS is triangle-free by computing the trace of A 3 where A is the adjacency matrix of G½VnS. As we mentioned above, this can be done in OððN À kÞ 2:372 Þ.
Therefore, CSA(G, k, C(G)) is in NP. Now, given an instance boolean formula / of 3-SAT with m variables and l clauses, we will construct an instance of CSA(G, k, C(G)), where k ¼ m þ 2l, as follows: 
4. finally, for every edge in G, create a dummy vertex d (color it red) and connect d to the two endpoints of that edge. Figure 2 illustrates the reduction of the toy boolean formula ðx 1 _ :x 2 _ x 3 Þ^ð:x 1 _ x 2 _ :x 3 Þ. In this example, step 1 introduces two 3-cliques with blue vertices, step 2 creates three pairs of green vertices, and step 3 consequently connects blue vertices to their corresponding green vertices by the thick curly edges. Finally, step 4 assembles dummy nodes d's (in red) and two dotted lines for every existing edges in G.
Let G Àd denote the graph G without dummy vertices d's and their adjacent dotted edges. Assume that / has a satisfied assignment, we construct S by (1) include in S all vertices corresponding to true literals, and (2) for each clause, include in S all vertices of the 3-clique but the one corresponding to its first true literal. Thus, S includes m green vertices and 2l blue vertices. It is verifiable that vertices in S form the vertex cover of G Àd . As a result, the removal of all nodes in S will make G½VnS triangle-free (since it leaves no edges in G Àd ).
Suppose there exists a set S of k nodes such that removing k nodes in S leaves G½VnS triangle-free. We note that S will not contain any dummy node d because replacing d by any of its adjacent literals (which are not already in S yet) yields a better solution in term of triangle coverage. As a consequence, S only contains blue and green vertices. Furthermore, nodes in S have to be indeed the vertex cover of G Àd in order for G½VnS to be trianglefree. This cover must contain one green vertex for each variable and two blue vertices for each 3-clique (or clause), requiring exactly k ¼ m þ 2l vertices. Now, assign value true to the variables whose positive literals are in S. Because k ¼ m þ 2l, for each clause at least one edge connecting its blue 3-clique to the green vertices is covered by a variable vertex. Hence, the clause is satisfied. h 5 Vulnerability analysis in random failure
Non-monotonicity of ALCC
The value of ALCC is not monotonic in terms of the set of excluded nodes S. Counterexamples showing the nonmonotonicity of ALCC are presented in Fig. 3a . This implies that we do not always have either CðG½VnS 1 Þ ! CðG½VnS 2 Þ or CðG½VnS 1 Þ CðG½VnS 2 Þ for any subsets S 1 S 2 V. In fact, it is possible that ALCC could be at a local minimum with further node removal increasing the value of ALCC. Our analysis in Sect. 5.2 shows that is always possible to degrade the value of ALCC by removing a vertex. We show that in any network G there exists a vertex u such thatC u ðGÞ CðGÞ. This result is the basis of the algorithms we present in Sect. 6. 
Analysis of random failure
When random failures occur, the ALCC value is unpredictable due to the non-monotonicity of ALCC. That is, the removal of nodes can result in either higher or lower ALCC of the residual graph. We show that under uniform random failures the expected ALCC E u ½C u ðGÞ is at most the current ALCC value (Theorem 2). This result also indicates that, given a network G, there exists a sequence of subgraphs G i of G whose ALCC values form a non-increasing sequence (Corollary 1).
Lemma 1 In a graph G, the following statements hold: Proof For each neighbor v of u, the number of triangles that contain both u and v is jNðuÞ \ NðvÞj. Since each triangle containing u contains exactly two neighbors of u, it follows that the summation P v2NðuÞ jNðuÞ \ NðvÞj counts twice the number of triangles containing u.
h Lemma 3 For any node u 2 V;
Proof Rewrite Eq.
(2) as: X v2VnfugC v ðuÞ ðN À 1ÞCðuÞ:
To prove this Lemma, we will show the following statements regarding the degree of u:
Expanding the left-hand side (LHS) of this inequality yields X 
To find P v2VnðNðuÞ[fugÞC v ðuÞ, we use the fact that removing a non-neighbor node of u will not affect the local clustering coefficient C(u), i.e.,C v ðuÞ ¼ CðuÞ for v 2 VnðNðuÞ [ fugÞ. There are ðN À d u À 1Þ non-neighbors vertices of u in G. Thus, the second term of (5) follows. To evaluate the first term of Eq. (5), we consider two cases: Case (i): when d u 2 (i.e., u has only one or two neighbors). In this case, the removal of any neighbor of u will make d u 1, and thus, will dropC v ðuÞ to 0 based on the definition of LCC. This implies 0 ¼ X 
Algorithms
We present two algorithms for CSA problem, namely simple_greedy (Algorithm 1) and Fast Adaptive Greedy Algorithm-FAGA (Algorithm 2). Algorithm 1 is a simpler greedy algorithm than FAGA, which employs more sophisticated strategies to more efficiently provide a solution of significantly higher quality than Algorithm 1.
Simple Greedy algorithm
Our first algorithm (Algorithm 1) computes for each node u the ALCC value after removing u, denoted byC u ðGÞ. Time-complexity The complexity of Algorithm 1 depends on the N calls to compute the ALCC of the network. There are two state-of-the-art methods in Gall (2014) ) and Schank and Wagner (2005) for this purpose. If ALCC is computed using the matrix multiplying technique in Gall (2014) , the time-complexity is OðN x Þ with x 2:372. Alternatively, if ALCC is computed using the method in Schank and Wagner (2005) , which has complexity of OðM 3=2 Þ, the overall complexity will be OðNM 3=2 Þ. In practice, neither of these two upper bounds fully dominates the other. In our experimental evaluation in Sect. 8, we utilize Schank and Wagner (2005) for computing ALCC.
Fast Adaptive Greedy Algorithm
We next present the Fast Adaptive Greedy Algorithm (FAGA-Algorithm 2) that significantly improves simple_greedy. For small values of k, this algorithm requires as much time as computing ALCC only once; it is N times faster than its predecessor. Furthermore, it provides a significant quality improvement over simple_-greedy in our empirical studies.
In principle, FAGA employs an adaptive strategy in computing the reduction of ALCC when nodes are removed iteratively. At each round, the node v incurring the highest reduction in ALCC is selected into the solution. As shown in the proof of Theorem 3, a node v does exist at any iteration. Node v is removed from the graph and the procedure repeats itself for the remaining vertices; that is, FAGA recomputes for each vertex u, which is not yet in the solution, its ALCC reduction DC u when u is removed from the graph. This strategy provides better solution quality than the non-adaptive greedy algorithm. While it is more complicated than the previous approach, it can be done faster than simple_greedy as we show in the following discussion.
We structure FAGA into two phases. The first phase (lines 1-15) extends the algorithm in Schank and Wagner (2005) to compute both ALCC and the number of triangles that are incident with each edge and node in the graph. This algorithm was proved to be time-optimal in hðM 3=2 Þ for triangle-listing and has been shown to be very efficient in practice. The second phase (lines 16-33) repeats the vertex selection for k rounds. In each round, we select the node u max which decreases the clustering coefficient the most into the solution, remove u max from the graph, and perform the necessary update for DC u for the remaining nodes u 2 V.
The key efficiency of FAGA algorithm is in its update procedure for DC u . The update DC u for remaining nodes after removing u max can be done in linear time. This is made possible due to the information on the number of triangles involving each edge. The correctness of this update formulation (lines 18-26) is proved in the following lemma.
Lemma 4 Let N 2 ðuÞ ¼ fv 2 NðuÞ : dðvÞ ¼ 2g; N [ 2 ðuÞ ¼ fv 2 NðuÞ : dðvÞ [ 2g. For each u 2 V; DC u ðGÞ can be computed in the following way:
4TðvÞð1 À NÞ þ 2Tðu; vÞNdðvÞ À 2TðvÞdðvÞ NðN À 1ÞdðvÞðdðvÞ À 1ÞðdðvÞ À 2Þ þ X ;
4TðvÞð1 À NÞ þ 2Tðu; vÞNdðvÞ À 2TðvÞdðvÞ NðN À 1ÞdðvÞðdðvÞ À 1ÞðdðvÞ À 2Þ :
Let v 2 N 2 ðuÞ. Before removal of u, v is in T(v) triangles. After removal, v is in 0 triangles; hence, the result follows. h
One important feature of FAGA is that the produced residual ALCC values will form a non-increasing sequence. This feature is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 3
The ALCC values of networks after each iteration (Algorithm 2, lines 16-28) form a non-increasing sequence.
Proof We first show that in a graph G, there always exists a node u such thatC u ðGÞ CðGÞ. Assume otherwise, that isC v ðGÞ [ CðGÞ for all node v 2 V. This implies P v2VC v ðGÞ [ N Â CðGÞ which contradicts Theorem 2. Thus, the statement holds true. Finally, the theorem follows because at each step we select the nodes that maximally degrades ALCC of the whole network.
h Time-complexity: The first phase takes OðM 3=2 Þ as in Schank and Wagner (2005) . The second phase takes a linear time in each round and has a total time-complexity OðkðN þ MÞÞ. Thus, the overall complexity is OðM 3=2 þ kðM þ NÞÞ. When k\M 1=2 , the algorithm has an effective time-complexity OðN 3=2 Þ, which is N times faster than simple_greedy.
Clustering and the spread of information
In this section, we provide additional evidence for the relationship between the propagation of information in a social network and the average network clustering. Since information cannot propagate from one connected component to another, we consider this relationship when the graph G representing the social network is connected. Thus, we consider connected graphs with different values of ALCC. We define the relevant models of influence propagation in Sect. 7.1; then, we demonstrate an empirical relationship in Sect. 7.2; next, we provide theoretical evidence in support of this relationship in Sect. 7.3.
Models of influence
To observe the effect of ALCC on influence propagation, we adopted the following two standard models (Kempe et al. 2003) ; intuitively, the idea of a model of influence propagation in a network is a way by which nodes can be activated given a set of seed nodes. An instance of influence propagation on a graph G follows the independent cascade (IC) model if a weight can be assigned to each edge such that the propagation probabilities can be computed as follows: once a node u first becomes active, it is given a single chance to activate each currently inactive neighbor v with probability proportional to the weight of the edge (u, v) . In the linear threshold (LT) model each network user u has an associated threshold hðuÞ chosen uniformly from [0, 1] which determines how much influence (the sum of the weights of incoming edges) is required to activate u. u becomes active if the total influence from its active neighbors exceeds the threshold hðuÞ.
Experimental evidence
To test the relationship between influence propagation and clustering empirically, we used a d-dimensional generalization of the Watts-Strogatz graphs (Watts and Strogatz 1998); a graph generated by this model starts as a ring lattice, defined as follows. For these experiments, we used n ¼ 100; d ¼ 2; and k ¼ 3. With probability p, each edge in the graph is rewired; that is, replaced with an edge between two uniformly randomly chosen vertices. By varying p, one can control the level of clustering in the network, as shown in Fig. 1 . Each graph generated in this manner has the same number of edges.
The expected activation was computed using a single seed node and an IT or LT realization; this computation was averaged over 1000 trials. When we normalize by the initial value, Fig. 1 shows a remarkable similarity between the normalized ALCC value and the normalized activations, for both the IC and LT models. Therefore, these results provide evidence supporting a positive correlation between ALCC and the expected activation of both the IC and LT models of information propagation.
Theoretical evidence of relationship between ALCC and influence propagation
In this section, we provide further evidence supporting the relationship between clustering and influence propagation, in the form of the following proposition, which shows how the probability of activation increases when more neighbors are shared; with higher ALCC, we may expect a higher fraction of shared neighbors between adjacent nodes. Proposition 1 Suppose s, is activated; let t be a neighbor of s, and suppose s, t share k neighbors. Consider the IC model with uniform probability 1 / 2 on each edge. Then Pr t becomes activated ð Þ ! 1 À ð1=2Þ Á ð3=4Þ k :
Proof Let A be the event that edge (s, t) exists, and let B be the event that edge (s, t) does not exist, but for a common neighbor n, the edges (s, n), (n, t) exist. For each common neighbor n, let A n be the event that both edges (s, n), (n, t) exist. Then
Notice that PrðA n Þ ¼ 1=4, and let NðsÞ \ NðtÞ ¼ fn 1 ; . . .; n k g. By the inclusion-exclusion principle, we have that
Therefore, PrðAÞ þ PrðBÞ ¼ 1 À ð1=2Þ Á ð3=4Þ k . h
Experimental evaluation
We present the empirical results of our proposed algorithms on synthesized and real networks. In Sect. 8.1, we describe our methodology; in Sects. 8.2 and 8.3, we analyze the efficacy of degrading AlCC, maximum LCC, respectively; in Sect. 8.4, we analyze the running time of the algorithms.
Methodology
Algorithms We are unaware of any competitive method that specifically minimizes ALCC, so to evaluate our approaches we compare to the following strategies:
• random_fail: Remove nodes uniformly at random, • lcc_greedy: Remove nodes in greedy fashion according to highest local clustering coefficient, • max_degree: Remove nodes in greedy fashion according to highest degree, • betweenness: Removes in greedy fashion according to the highest betweenness centrality.
• optimal: For a network with 35 nodes, we were able to compute the optimal solution to CVA by exhaustive enumeration.
Method legends are described in Fig. 4h . Real-world traces include Facebook (Viswanath et al. 2009 ), ArXiv ePrint citation (ArXiv dataset 2003), and NetHEPT networks (Chen et al. 2010) . The trace of Facebook has 25,492 users and 464,237 friendship links, NetHEPT has 15,234 authors with 31,376 connections, and ArXiv has 26,197 nodes with 14,484 edges. The parameter k is set to a fraction of the total number of nodes in each graph. Besides ALCC, we also evaluate how the removal of critical nodes affects the maximum local clustering coefficient (LCC).
Results on average local clustering coefficient
In this section, we present results on the efficacy of the various algorithms to lower the ALCC. We observe (1) the performance of our algorithms in view of other strategies, and more importantly (2) the critical behavior of clustering coefficient when crucial nodes are removed by different criteria. The empirical results on synthesized and real data are presented in Fig. 4 .
As depicted in the subfigures, ALCC values produced by our algorithm fast_greedy are consistently the best (lowest) values in all test cases, except in the ER network with 35 nodes where optimal was able to run. A visualization of the optimal solution on this network for k ¼ 7 is shown in Fig. 5 . In the ER network with 10,000 nodes, fast_greedy, lcc_greedy, and simple_greedy methods quickly destroy clustering as soon as 0.02 fraction of nodes (on fast_greedy and lcc_greedy) and 0.05 fraction of nodes (on simple_greedy) are excluded from the networks. Interestingly, max_degree and betweenness methods do not appear much better than the baseline random_failure method, especially for betweenness. A possible explanation for this is the independence and equal probability of wiring edges in ER model. Moreover, because ER model neither generates triadic closures nor forms hubs, the network structure might be easily broken when a few random but important nodes are removed.
In WS model, we observe the same degrading behavior of ALCC value produced by all methods with fast_-greedy outperforming lcc_greedy and simple_-greedy methods. Also in this model, these three methods outperformed the rest by a large magnitude. In BA model, fast_greedy still performs best, closely followed by max_degree and betweenness methods. As BA model generates graphs with references given to the powerlaw distribution (i.e., forming hubs) the performance of max_degree and betweenness can be explained. lcc_greedy does not do well in this type of network as it takes a considerable fraction of total nodes in order to degrade the average local clustering coefficient.
In conclusion, fast_greedy is the best approach that consistently discovers nodes that are most important to the network clustering. The experiments also suggest that max_degree and betweenness, despite their popularity, might not be ideal methods to analyze structural vulnerability of complex networks. In addition, these experiments also show that (1) ALCC isn't very susceptible to random failures, and (2) network clusters generated by ER, WS, and BA can potentially be vulnerable to targeted attacks as the respective ALCC can quickly be impaired when only a few vertices are removed from the graphs.
In real data, the superior nature of fast_greedy becomes more visible as it beats other strategies by a significant gap. In real traces, max_degree and betweenness perform similarly while lcc_greedy and simple_greedy methods fluctuate in between. random_failure, unsurprisingly, remains the worst. We observe that even in big real networks, fast_greedy performs very well by degrading the ALCC dramatically (nearly 90%, 33%, and 55% of ALCC decrement on ArXiv, NetHEPT, and Facebook) as more nodes are excluded from the data. This fact implies that those practical systems, despite their complex structure and functionality, commonly expose their clustering vulnerability to targeted or adversarial attacks. Our proposed approach fast_greedy effectively discovers the critical nodes with high impact to those network structures. The results also demonstrate that simple_greedy and lcc_greedy are also good options though they require long execution time as we show below.
Maximum local clustering coefficient
We next examine the maximum local clustering coefficient (max-LCC) of nodes remaining in the residual graphs. This local measure is meaningful in the sense that a small max-LCC of a network indicates a low level of clustering. Therefore, we observe how the methods reduce the max-LCC of the graphs. The results are reported in Fig. 6 . The subfigures indicate that fast_greedy is really effective in not only degrading ALCC but also the max-LCC of all tested networks. In ER and BA models, fast_greedy quickly destroys the clustering coefficients at just 0.02% total nodes removed, and only lags behind lcc_greedy (which was expected to be the leading method) in WS model and Facebook. Furthermore, fast_greedy appears to be more stable than the others as it does not fluctuate between high and low values. In Facebook data, fast_greedy quickly degrades max-LCC values from 1 to approximately 0.5. This fact indicates that the resulting Facebook clusters and structure might not be very robust. In ArXiv and NetHEPT data, all methods are unable to degrade the LCC which demonstrates that there are a lot of local clusters in these networks.
Running time
The running time of all methods is presented in Fig. 7 . As the baseline methods, random_failure and max_degree do not require much time for their execution due to their simple nature whereas lcc_greedy, in contrast, requires a considerable amount of execution time. fast_greedy and betweenness algorithms on Notice that the residual graph after removal of the optimal solution is triangle-free average require fairly similar amounts of time for their tasks on all networks. simple_greedy, as a payoff for its simple design and implementation, takes a significant amount of time to finish its tasks (at least 5 times more than that taken by lcc_greedy) and is excluded from the charts for more visibility.
Conclusion
Clustering vulnerability is an important aspect in assessing the robustness of complex networks, as the level of clustering has significance for a variety of applications, including a salient role in the propagation of information in a social network. We have shown the discovery of the most important nodes to clustering is NP-complete, and we offer two polynomial time heuristics for this identification. Empirical results in comparison with different strategies on synthesized and real networks show that the average local clustering coefficient is robust to failure of random nodes and confirm that our suggested algorithm FAGA (fast_greedy) is effective in analyzing node vulnerability of clustering and is scalable to larger networks.
